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Abstract 
Recent literature suggests that the market structure is an endogenous variable 
that is determined by a firm’s behaviour and the competitive environment of 
the industry. This study examines the relation between the market structure and 
the banks’ behaviour in Indonesian banking by considering the endogeneity 
problem of them as variables. The estimations using the Vector-Error-
Correction approach suggest that the structural approach provides a valid pre-
diction of the relationship between market structure and bank behaviour by 
recognizing the endogeneity issue between those two variables. The banking 
industry would be more competitive if the market was less concentrated.  
 
Abstrak 
Literature menunjukkan bahwa struktur pasar adalah variabel endogen yang 
ditentukan oleh perilaku perusahaan dan kondisi persaingan dalam industri ter-
sebut. Studi ini menganalisis hubungan antara struktur pasar dan perilaku bank 
di Indonesia dengan memperhatikan masalah endogeneity dalam model. Hasil 
estimasi dengan menggunakan pendekatan Vector-Error-Correction menun-
jukkan bahwa pendekatan struktural dapat digunakan untuk memprediksi hu-
bungan antara struktur pasar dan perilaku bank. Bank-bank dalam industri yang 
memiliki indeks konsentrasi yang rendah akan berperilaku kompetitif. 
 
 
Introduction 
Indonesian banking has been consolidated 
since the late 1990s following the 1997 cri-
sis. The Indonesian Banking Architecture 
(API) and Basel II were introduced to 
create a stronger and more stable banking 
industry. Banks have to meet a higher min-
imum capital requirement and a better risk 
management standard. To comply with the 
requirements, banks can merge or invite 
new shareholders. In addition to more 
stringent regulation, entry of newly estab-
lished banks is prohibited (Rosengard and 
Prasetyantoko, 2011). In the 2000s, the 
number of banks reduced significantly into 
a half of the figure in the early 1990s. 
There were 109 commercial banks in 2010 
down from 228 banks in 1994. In terms of 
market concentration, the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index was higher, particularly 
in the early 2000, and increased by 45 per 
cent compared to period prior to 1997 cri-
sis. This indicates that recently the Indone-
sian banking industry became more con-
centrated than in the 1990s. 
The current policies contributed to 
create a more concentrated industry. A 
higher degree of market concentration is 
caused by the banking consolidation and 
the introduction of barrier to entry for new-
ly established banks and the change of 
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mode of entry of foreign banks. Recently, 
foreign banks entered the local market 
through acquisition of the local existing 
banks. This mode of entry is more common 
than the establishment of de novo banks 
(new established banks, not necessarily 
foreign banks), for example through new 
joint ventures or branches of foreign banks. 
Thus, the increasing number of foreign 
banks was not associated with a growing 
number of banks in the industry. It is im-
portant to examine the relationship between 
market concentration and competition in 
the Indonesian banking industry. The 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) or 
structural approach, a well-established 
theory, suggests that a concentrated market 
leads to less competitive behaviour and 
creates excess profit for firms (Mason, 
1939). In contrast, a less concentrated mar-
ket enhances competition and produce bet-
ter market performance such as a lowering 
of profits and prices.  
This study contributes to knowledge 
development by considering the recent de-
velopment of market structure research of 
the New Industrial Organization approach 
in examining the competitive environment 
in the Indonesian banking industry. The 
market structure, which is usually meas-
ured by market concentration, is not an ex-
ogenous variable. Rather, it is an endogen-
ous variable that is also determined by oth-
er variables, for example the existence of 
barriers to entry (Baumol, 1982) and the 
level of efficiency (Peltzman, 1977; Smir-
lock, 1985). It is argued that the structure 
of a market depends on its output vector 
rather than it is being determined exogen-
ously Baumol (1982). An efficient scale of 
production determines the number of firms 
supplying market. The Vector Error Cor-
rection Model (VECM) is applied to man-
age the endogeneity problem of the market 
structure. Furthermore, this study covers 
the recent three-decades of Indonesian 
banking to reflect the structural changes 
from a highly regulated industry to a less 
regulated and liberalized industry. The 
structural changes influence the degree of 
market concentration and the competitive 
environment in the Indonesian banking in-
dustry. 
There are two competing paradigms 
which attempt to address the issue of mar-
ket structure; firms’ behaviour and market 
performance. The first paradigm is the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) and 
the second paradigm is the New Industrial 
Organization (NIO). The first paradigm 
emerged in 1939 through an article written 
by Edward S. Mason in the American Eco-
nomic Review, entitled “Price and produc-
tion policies of large-scale enterprises“. 
The article argued that differences in mar-
ket structure are the source of the differ-
ences in price responses (Mason, 1939). 
Further, market structure determines the 
distribution of economic resources among 
different users, for example between pro-
ducers and consumers. In a monopoly mar-
ket, firms restrict output and investment 
below the level of a competitive market and 
drive the price up. Monopoly markets 
create excess profit for the producers at the 
expense of consumers. In contrast, firms in 
a perfectly competitive market could not 
affect market price as the demand curve is 
perfectly elastic for each individual firm. In 
equilibrium, the market produces at the 
lowest average cost where the price level is 
the same as the marginal cost. Therefore, 
perfect competition will not create an 
excess profit for producers and will not 
create loss for the consumers. 
The study of Mason Mason (1939) 
became the foundation of the first para-
digm. It is known as the Structure-Conduct-
Performance hypothesis or the structural 
approach because it argues that there is a 
direct relationship between market struc-
ture, the behaviour of firms and market per-
formance (Mason, 1939) In most studies 
market structure is determined by the level 
of concentration of output in a few (Bain, 
1951; Berger and Hannan, 1989; Bikker 
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and Haaf, 2002; Neumark and Sharpe, 
1992). The concentrated market reduces the 
cost of collusion so it facilitates collusive 
behaviour. Therefore, this market produces 
poor performance where the price ratio to 
cost is high at the expense of lower con-
sumer welfare. In contrast, the competitive 
market will produce an efficient outcome 
as price equals marginal cost. Thus, an in-
crease in firm numbers and lower market 
concentration will lead to more competitive 
conduct evidenced by lowering prices and 
reducing a firm’s profitability. In general, 
the structural approach argues that market 
structure is an exogenous variable that 
comes from outside the model. Further, 
market structure determines firms’ beha-
viour and market performance.  
However, other studies found evi-
dence that the relationship between market 
structure, firm behaviour and market per-
formance is not linear (Baumol, 1982; 
Demsetz, 1973; Peltzman, 1977; Smirlock, 
1985; Smirlock et al., 1984). The findings 
are consistent with the second paradigm of 
the Non-structuralist. Under the second pa-
radigm, economists look beyond the num-
ber of firms and market concentration in an 
industry in determining the characteristics 
likely to promote a competitive industry 
and keep economic profit low. They argue 
that a competitive industry may also exist 
even when only a small number of firms 
operate in the industry or in the case of a 
concentrated market.  
The market structure is an endogen-
ous variable rather than an exogenous vari-
able. Further, some studies suggest that the 
existence of contestable markets deter-
mines the structure of a market (Baumol, 
1982; Demsetz, 1973; Molyneux et al., 
1996; Peltzman, 1977; Smirlock, 1985; 
Smirlock et al., 1984). Contestable markets 
require freedom of entry and exit. The re-
moval of restrictions to enter the market is 
one main factor creating contestable mar-
kets (Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Sengup-
ta, 2007). In addition, the removal of re-
strictions in conducting business, for ex-
ample interest rate control and lending lim-
its, contribute to creation of contestable 
markets.  
Some studies found that the pene-
tration of foreign banks into a market is 
also important for creating contestable 
market. The entry of foreign banks encou-
rages local banks to be more competitive 
by enhancing their efficiency and lowering 
the spread of interest rates (Claessens et al., 
1998; Cole et al., 2004; Jeon et al., 2011; 
Manlagñit, 2011; Martinez Peria and Mo-
dy, 2004; Unite and Sullivan, 2003). Par-
ticularly, the penetration of foreign banks 
put pressure on local banks to lower their 
costs (Clarke et al., 2001, and to increase 
their efficiency and lower profits (Man-
lagñit, 2011; Sengupta, 2007). Penetration 
of foreign banks also explains the lower 
intermediation costs in the local banking 
(Claessens et al., 1998 because foreign 
banks had lower operating expenses (Mar-
tinez Peria and Mody, 2004; Unite and Sul-
livan, 2003 and overhead costs (Manlagñit, 
2011). In addition, foreign banks had a 
lower spread of interest rates (Martinez Pe-
ria and Mody, 2004) and better loan 
(Claessens et al., 1998).  
However, the current penetration of 
foreign banks in the form of merger and 
acquisition of local existing banks (foreign 
acquired banks) is less effective in improv-
ing banking competitive environment com-
pared to the establishment of de novo 
banks. De novo operations as either pene-
tration through the establishment of 
branches or the formation of subsidiaries of 
foreign banks in local banking (Claeys and 
Hainz, 2006; Clarke et al., 2001; Sengupta 
2007). Subsidiary refers to a fully owned 
subsidiary of foreign banks or joint ven-
tures with foreign banks as a majority 
shareholder (Montgomery, 2003). It is ar-
gued that de novo banks operated with low-
er spreads compared to foreign banks that 
entered the market by acquiring local exist-
ing (Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004). The 
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literature also suggests that de novo banks 
are more aggressive because they are new 
business entities unlike the foreign acquired 
banks. On one hand, de novo banks as the 
newcomers are more willing to charge low-
er rates because they have to work hard to 
establish market share (Martinez Peria and 
Mody, 2004). On the other hand, the for-
eign acquired banks already have a captive 
market from the acquired local banks. In 
addition, as a new business entity a de novo 
bank is not likely to possess knowledge 
about borrowers in the local banking indus-
try. Furthermore, de novo banks focus on 
transparent segments of the market where 
the information asymmetry is lower and 
information about borrowers can be ac-
cessed (Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004; 
Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004). The seg-
ment of the transparent borrowers is per-
ceived to be more competitive thus de novo 
banks have to charge a lower spread in or-
der to attract these borrowers (Dell'Ariccia 
and Marquez, 2004). 
Other studies also suggest that a de 
novo foreign bank entry had a stronger pos-
itive impact on competition than foreign 
acquired banks. Furthermore, literature 
highlighted another disadvantage of having 
foreign entry through the acquisition of lo-
cal existing banks. Two studies confirm 
that foreign presence through acquisition of 
local existing banks reduced the supply of 
small business credit (Clarke et al., 2001; 
Berger et al., 2004). However, foreign en-
try through the acquisition of local existing 
banks may induce the entry of de novo in 
order to supply loans to small firms.  
In addition to the modes of entry, 
the level of development also contributes to 
explain the role of foreign banks in creating 
a contestable market. The study about im-
pact of foreign penetration in the local 
banking market revealed that with different 
levels of development, the influence of for-
eign banks changed (Lensink and Hermes, 
2004). Foreign penetration in the countries 
with lower levels of economic development 
had a higher spill-over impact than foreign 
penetration in developed countries. In 
countries with lower levels of development, 
the gap in terms of the adoption of modern 
techniques and practices between foreign 
and local banks was larger. Consequently, 
the gap between local and foreign banks 
was smaller in developed countries. How-
ever, their study also found that the spill-
over effect of foreign banks may also be 
lower in developing countries where the 
banking industry is segmented and the in-
cumbent local banks possess substantial 
market power. 
In addition to the penetration of for-
eign banks, the relationship between mar-
ket structure and competition is also influ-
enced by the proportion of government 
banks in the local banking market. Gov-
ernment banks are less competitive than 
their private counterparts because they have 
a long hierarchical organizational design 
(Williamson, 1967) and had a captive mar-
ket for both loans and deposits amongst the 
state enterprises (McLeod, 1999). The larg-
er proportion of government banks in the 
local market signals the existence of bar-
riers to entering or expansion by private 
banks. In the case of Indonesia prior to the 
banking reforms in the 1980s, state-owned 
banks dominated the banking industry with 
more than 80 per cent of deposits. The 
banking reforms in the 1980s removed the 
restrictions to enter the market. In addition, 
the reforms also lifted some hidden subsi-
dies and controls. Those policies provided 
equal treatment for state-owned, private, 
local and foreign banks. After the banking 
reforms, the domination of state commer-
cial banks declined and was replaced by 
their private counterparts. The above illu-
strations suggest that the domination of 
government banks in the local banking 
market determines the level of restrictions 
in the banking industry.  
Finally, the literature suggests that 
the macroeconomic environment deter-
mines the level of competition in the bank-
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ing industry. One study found that unfavor-
able macroeconomic conditions, for exam-
ple high inflation rates, may constrain 
competition in the banking industry (Claes-
sens and Laeven, 2004). Under conditions 
of high inflation, prices of financial servic-
es, for example interest rates, will be less 
informative. During the high inflation, the 
increase of interest rates reflects the in-
crease in inflation rather than a more ex-
pensive price of financial services. A study 
on emerging economies in Asia and Latin 
America also found that in a better macroe-
conomic environment with a high level of 
economic growth, a high level of gross 
domestic product and lower inflation are 
more capable of enhancing competition in 
the banking industry (Jeon et al., 2011). 
 
Research Method 
The Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM) is perceived as a suitable ap-
proach to examine the long-run relationship 
of market concentration evolution and the 
trend in foreign penetration on the evolu-
tion of banking competition. The model 
measures the long-run relationship and re-
veals the speed of adjustment to the equili-
brium. Furthermore, this model is suitable 
for a system that has a potential endogenei-
ty problem. Research under the New Indus-
trial Organization approach argues that 
market concentration is an endogenous va-
riable rather than an exogenous variable. 
This study performed the weak exogeneity 
test to examine the endogeneity in the 
model particularly between the measure of 
market concentration and competition. This 
study also acknowledges the possible en-
dogeneity problem between the measure of 
foreign penetration and competition as sig-
naled by the literature. It is argued that the 
decision of foreign banks to penetrate local 
banking may depend on the level of compe-
tition in the local banking industry. The 
foreign banks are more likely to enter a less 
competitive market. Therefore, the level of 
competition could be a determining factor 
for foreign penetration. This implies that 
foreign penetration may be endogenous in 
the model rather than being exogenous.  
The present study used a weak ex-
ogeneity test to examine whether there is an 
endogeneity problem in the model. The test 
uses the VECM equation 1 as below: 
 
 
 
Where  is  matrix and  is the adjust-
ment coefficient informing the speed of 
adjustment to equilibrium. If all 
ij
 in row i 
of  are equal to zero, the corresponding 
cointegration equation determines the i
th
  
element of X
t
 is weakly (Lutkepohl and 
Kratzig, 2004). Table 1 shows that compe-
tition and market concentration are endo-
genous while foreign penetration is weakly 
exogenous. This test supports the argument 
that there is a potential endogeneity prob-
lem in a system.  
For the three variables case with 
one cointegrated relationship, the VECM  
can be expressed as follows: 
  
	 
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Table 1: Weak Exogeneity Test 
 Competition Market concentration Foreign penetration 
Chi-square(1) 6.847378 9.041818 0.646321 
Probability 0.008877* 0.002639* 0.421431 
* Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at a 1 per cent level. 
Note: the test for weak exogeneity is run under the assumption of one cointegrating equation. The 
failure to reject the null hypothesis is evidence of the weak exogeneity of the variable of interest.  
 
Table 2: Specification of the Variables 
Variable Definition Specification 
H Competition Yearly H-statistics of the Panzar-Rosse method *. 
HHI Market (Measure 
of Market Structure 
concentration) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. The formula to calculate     ! 	  ** 
FP Foreign penetration The proportion of foreign banks in the banking industry.  
Foreign banks are defined as those with foreign owner-
ship of at least 50 per cent.  
DE NOVO De novo banks The proportion of de novo banks in the banking industry. De 
novo banks are joint venture and branches of foreign banks. 
GOV Government banks The proportion of assets of government banks in the 
banking industry. 
GDP_percapita GDP per capita A measure of the level of development.  
INFLATION 
D2000 
Inflation 
Dummy of the year 
2000 
The inflation rate. 
D2000 equals one if the observation period is between 
2000 and 2010, and zero if otherwise 
***
. 
Note:  
* The description of the yearly H-statistics of  the Panzar-Rosse method is available in the appendix. 
**  s
i
 refers to the market share of bank i in the market and n is the number of banks. The Herfin-
dahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) ranges from 1/N to one, where N is the number of banks in the 
market. The magnitude of HHI implies the level of concentration in the industry where the larger 
the value of the index demonstrates a more concentrated market. For an industry that consists of 
a single monopoly, HHI=1 because a monopolist has a market share of s
1
 =1 thus  = =1"  On 
the other hand, an industry with N banks with equal market shares will have HHI=1/N ((Lutke-
pohl and Kratzig, 2004). 
*** This dummy provides information on the impact of the changing type of foreign penetration. 
Prior to the year 2000, foreign penetration was only in the form of de novo operations. After 
2000, foreign entry to the market was in the form of de novo and foreign acquired banks. 
Source: The annual financial reports of banks collected from the Central Bank of Indonesia. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The Augmented Dickey Fuller test was 
employed to test the existence of unit roots 
for each variable. In order to determine 
whether the test requires a constant and/or 
trend or not, the graphical presentation of 
time-series data for each variable can be 
used. The plots demonstrate whether the 
time-series data fluctuates around a non-
zero mean or not. If yes, it is more appro-
priate to include a constant in testing the 
unit-root. In applying the Augmented 
Dickey Fuller test, this study selected the 
length of lag for testing the variable. Some 
model selection parameters, for example, 
AIC, SIC and FPE, can be used to guide the 
selection of the lag length. For variables H, 
HHI, FP, DE NOVO, GOV, and 
GDP_percapita, all model selection para-
meters suggest using the lag length of one. 
In regard to INFLATION, model selection 
of the FPE suggests using a lag length of 2, 
the AIC suggests employing a lag length of 
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3, and the SC advises using a length of lag 
of 0. The unit root tests in table 3 show that 
the null hypothesis for the existence of a 
unit root cannot be rejected at the 5 per cent 
significance level. Further, the unit root test 
was carried out on the first difference. The 
test results showed that all variables are 
stationary at the first difference. It indicated 
that the variables are jointly integrated in 
the same level - I(1).  
A cointegrated test was conducted to 
confirm the previous presumption that the 
system of the variables is stationary at the 
first difference and jointly integrated. The 
Johansen cointegration test is conducted by 
firstly selecting the length of lag for the sys-
tem. The model selection parameters, such 
as AIC, SIC and FPE are employed to de-
termine the length of lag. This study ran 
some exercises involving the basic va-
riables, competition, market concentration 
and foreign penetration, and added other 
variables to the right-hand side of the equa-
tion. Table 5 and 6 propose some models to 
explain the relationship between the evolu-
tion of market concentration, trends in for-
eign penetration and the evolution of bank-
ing competition in the Indonesian banking 
industry between 1980 and 2010. The coin-
tegration tests show that Max-Eigen statis-
tics and Trace statistics rejected the null hy-
pothesis that the model has zero cointe-
grated rank. Further, when we test the null 
hypothesis of one cointegration rank, the 
Max-Eigen statistics and Trace statistics 
show that the null hypothesis could not be 
rejected at the 5 per cent significance level. 
The result of cointegration tests reveal that 
in all models, the variables are integrated 
and they have one cointegrated rank. Table 
4 provides the descriptive statistics of all 
variables employed in this study. The de-
pendent variable is the level of competition 
which is measured by H-statistics (H). 
 
Table 3: Unit Root Test 
Variable 
No. of 
lags 
ADF Test Statistics 
ADF Critical Value 
(1 %) 
Result 
Levels First difference 
Ln(H) 1 -3.075 -3.893 -2.968 I(1) 
Ln(HHI) 1 -2.217 -3.377 -2.968 I(1) 
Ln(FP) 1 -0.064 -6.104 -2.968 I(1) 
Ln(DE NOVO) 1 -1.188 -6.149 -2.968 I(1) 
Ln(GOV) 1 -1.642 -5.134 -2.968 I(1) 
Ln(GDP_percapita) 1 -0.546 -3.306 - 2.968 I(1) 
Ln(INFLATION) 2 -2.731 -4.764 - 2.976 I(1) 
Note: The null hypothesis of unit root is rejected if ADF test statistics < ADF critical value.  
ADF critical values are MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-value at 5 per cent significance level, pro-
vided by Eviews software. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
H HHI FP DE NOVO GOV 
GDP_ 
Percapita (US$) 
INFLATION 
(per cent) 
 Mean  0.28  0.09  0.17  0.09  0.59  717.03  10.69 
 Median  0.29  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.51  748.32  9.28 
 Maximum  0.87  0.19  0.43  0.19  0.88  1,145.38  58.39 
 Minimum  0.01  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.26  390  3.72 
 Std. Dev.  0.17  0.04  0.15  0.04  0.17  215.17  9.57 
 Skewness  1.10  0.97  0.79  0.40  0.39  0.12  4.19 
 Kurtosis  5.68  2.99  1.91  2.26  1.97  1.99  21.32 
 Jarque-Bera  15.51  4.86  4.73  1.50  2.15  1.38  524.14 
 Probability of 
Jarque-Bera 
 0.000  0.09  0.09  0.47  0.34  0.50  0.00 
Sum  8.70  2.90  5.25  2.83  18.36  22,228  331.39 
Sum Sq. Dev.  0.88  0.05  0.64  0.05  0.88  1,435,085  2,748.87 
Observations  31  31  31  31  31  31  31 
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Note: There is some rounding as the heights of some bars with the same HHI index are not similar. 
Figure 1: The Banking Concentration, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in the Indonesian 
Banking between 1980 and 2010 
 
In regard to the measure of market 
structure, the degree of market concentra-
tion began to increase following the 1997 
crisis. As shown in figure 1, in 1999 and 
2000 the HHI index reached its highest lev-
el of 0.12 after the banking deregulation in 
the 1980s. The increase in market concen-
tration was associated with the reduction in 
the number of banks due to the closure of 
banks and bank mergers. The closure of 
banks, many of which were small banks, 
had skewed the market share distribution to 
large banks. Furthermore, the merger of 
state banks into Bank Mandiri also contri-
buted to increased market inequality. Dur-
ing the consolidation period in the 2000s, 
the HHI index was higher compared to the 
deregulation and liberalization period; 
however it was still lower compared to the 
crisis period in 1998-2000. In the 2000s the 
degree of market concentration gradually 
lowered to 0.06, especially after 2004. In 
order to comply with the current minimum 
capital requirement that was introduced in 
2004, small and medium-sized banks 
merged. The mergers of medium-sized and 
small banks improved the distribution of 
market share and reduced the market con-
centration.  
The main focus of the seven models 
in table 5 is on the contribution of market 
concentration to banking competition. The 
long-run coefficients of market concentra-
tion (HHI) of all seven models are negative 
and the values are significant in five of 
seven models. These findings support the 
structural approach that market concentra-
tion was negatively related to the competi-
tion in Indonesian banking during the past 
thirty years. The banking industry was 
more competitive when the market was less 
concentrated. In the un-concentrated mar-
ket, it had a large number of banks and/or a 
more equal-distribution of market shares 
between banks. The larger number of banks 
increased the cost of collusion. Thus, a 
smaller number of banks were more favor-
able to uncompetitive behaviour. In regards 
to the distribution of market share, a small 
number of large banks were likely to con-
tribute to create a concentrated market, 
even though the overall number of banks 
was large. In contrast, a handful of banks 
with relatively equal market share contri-
buted to a less concentrated market.  
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Figure 2: Market Concentration Index and the Number of Bank 
 
Figure 2 demonstrates that the 
number of banks has a negative relation to 
the degree of market concentration. The 
figure below shows the evolution of market 
structure by comparing the number of 
banks prior to deregulation and after dere-
gulation periods. Prior to deregulation, 
there were substantial barriers to entry, 
both for local private and foreign banks.  
Furthermore, the restrictive banking envi-
ronment, for example, the limits on loans 
and limits on interest rates of time deposits 
for state banks, created an unattractive in-
dustry. As a result, the number of banks 
was relatively small after a series of bank-
ing reforms in the 1980s. The introduction 
of the first banking reform in 1983 and the 
second banking reform in 1988 contributed 
to a reduction in the barriers to enter the 
market and relaxed some restrictions in the 
market. As a result, the number of banks 
increased substantially and created a less 
concentrated market. 
The distribution of market share 
was important in explaining the role of 
market concentration in influencing compe-
tition during the consolidation period. The 
data reveal that mergers and acquisitions in 
the 2000s reduced the skewness of the dis-
tribution of market share
1
. This occurred as 
 
1
 The skewness of the distribution of market shares is 
calculated by . Skewness charac-
mergers and acquisitions took place within 
the medium-sized and small banks, rather 
than being conducted by the large banks. 
Consolidation within smaller banks en-
hanced the size of merging banks and pro-
duced a more equal distribution of market 
share in Indonesian banking. Figure 3 de-
monstrates the positive relationship be-
tween the concentration index and the 
skewness of the market share distribution. 
A less skewed distribution of Indonesian 
banking in the 2000s would contribute to a 
less concentrated market if we compared to 
the 1997 crisis period.  
Tables 5 and 6 present the results of 
the estimations using the VECM, examin-
ing the role of market concentration and 
foreign penetration on competition. With 
regard to model number 5 in Table 5 and 
model 12 in Table 6, either the coefficient 
of market concentration or foreign penetra-
tion was negative but it was not significant. 
The estimations of models number 5 and 12 
reveal that there was another variable capa-
ble of explaining the evolution of banking 
competition. They indicate that the share of 
government banks, consisting of state 
owned banks and regional development 
banks, negatively and significantly influ-
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terizes the degree of asymmetry of a distribution around 
its means. Positive skewness indicates a distribution with 
an asymmetric tail extending toward more positive values. 
Negative skewness indicates a distribution with an asym-
metric tail extending toward more negative values. 
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enced banking competition at the one per 
cent confidence level. Figure 4 presents the 
trend of the competition index of H-
statistics and the proportion of the assets of 
government banks in the Indonesian bank-
ing industry. 
Table 6 proposes seven models (8 – 
15) to explore the relationship between the 
trend in foreign penetration and the evolu-
tion of banking competition. The cointegra-
tion tests show that Max-Eigen statistics 
and Trace statistics rejected the null hypo-
thesis that the models have zero cointe-
grated rank. Further, when we tested the 
null hypothesis of one cointegration rank, 
the Max-Eigen statistics and Trace statistics 
show that the null hypothesis could not be 
rejected at the 5 per cent significance level. 
The result of cointegration tests reveal that 
in all models, the variables are integrated 
and they have one cointegrated rank.  
The results of models 8, 10, 11 and 
15 using the VECM show that foreign pe-
netration was positively related to competi-
tion. This means that foreign penetration 
contributed to enhancing banking competi-
tion. However, the test of the significance 
of the coefficient of foreign penetration 
implies that the variable did not significant-
ly boost the level of competition. The coef-
ficient of foreign penetration was only sig-
nificant in model 11 which included the 
dummy of year 2000 to control for a 
change in policy with respect to foreign 
banks entering the market.  
 
Figure 3: Market Concentration Index and the Skewness of Market Share Distribution 
 
 
 Figure 4: Banking Competition and the Dominance of Government Bank 
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Figure 5: Foreign Penetration in the Indonesian Bankin
 
The evolution of banking competition 
was better explained by the penetration of 
novo operations either by establishing joint 
ventures or branches of foreign banks in the 
local market. Model 3 and 4 in Table 5 and 
model 9 and 13 in Table 6 show that penetr
tion of de novo banks was positively and si
nificantly related to banking competition at 
the 1 per cent confidence level. In order to 
examine the role of de novo 
ison with the role of foreign acquired bank
we added model 11 in Table 6. In model 11, 
a dummy variable of the year 2000 onward 
was employed. The dummy captures the 
changing pattern of foreign penetration from 
de novo operations prior to 2000 and both 
novo and merger and acquisition after 2000
as shown in figure 5. The coefficient of this 
dummy variable was negative but it was not 
significant. With the aim of better covering 
the changing pattern of foreign penetration, 
this study interacted the year dummy 2000 
with the proportion of foreign ass
banking industry in model 11 of Table 6. The 
coefficient of the interaction variable was 
also negative, but it was also not significant. 
The results suggest that having foreign pen
tration through the acquisition of local pri
banks in the 2000s did not 
prove competition in the Indonesian banking 
industry. 
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The empirical findings show that 
novo banks were more likely to put larger 
competitive pressure on local banks. This 
empirical finding is consistent with other 
studies for example Claeys and Hainz 
(2006) and Jeon, Olivero and Wu (2011). 
This study argues that 
more competitive because of at least three 
factors. Firstly, the market entry through 
the establishment of de novo 
market concentration because 
tablish a new entity unlike acquired foreign 
banks. Secondly, de novo 
established banks are more willing to 
charge lower rates to gain market share. 
The literature suggests that as a new bus
ness entity, de novo banks are 
possess knowledge about the borrowers in 
the local banking industry. In order to ta
get the transparent segments of the market 
where banks are able to access information 
about the borrowers, banks have to charge 
a lower rate for loans. Regard
acquired banks, they already have a captive 
market from acquired local banks. 
quiring local existing banks, the foreign 
banks or investors do not need to behave 
aggressively by offering much lower len
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Thirdly, in terms of assets, de novo 
banks were small banks with assets of 
43,431 million Rupiah between 2000 and 
2010. While foreign acquired banks are the 
larger banks with assets of 192, 100 million 
Rupiah on average between 2000 and 2010. 
Foreign acquired banks are mostly the bail-
out banks which divested from 2003 on-
wards. Most of the bail-out banks were 
formerly large banks with a 28.6 per cent 
share of assets of the Indonesia banking 
industry in 2009. As large and existing 
banks, the foreign acquired banks already 
have captive markets and loyal customers. 
Thus, foreign acquired banks generate less 
pressure on competition in the local bank-
ing market.  
To conclude, in regard to their role 
in creating a contestable market, de novo 
banks are willing to behave more aggres-
sively by cutting their interest margins. 
Therefore as indicated by the literature, 
they put pressure on the local market to 
lower the overall costs, lower the intermed-
iation costs, lower the overhead costs, im-
prove loan quality and reduce accounting 
profit. Another finding related to the level 
of development of the Indonesian economy 
is consistent with the literature. The influ-
ence of foreign banks on the competition 
was also affected by the level of develop-
ment.  Model 14 was estimated to assess 
the role of foreign penetration by control-
ling for the level of development in the In-
donesian economy. The level of develop-
ment is measured by per capita Gross Do-
mestic Product. Both the coefficients of 
foreign penetration and the level of devel-
opment are positive. The Indonesian econ-
omy benefits from the penetration of the 
foreign banks because this emerging econ-
omy receives a spill-over impact from the 
presence of foreign banks. Finally, the ma-
croeconomic environment represented by 
the rate of inflation, contributed to a com-
petitive banking industry. The estimation 
results of model 7 and 15 suggest that un-
favorable macroeconomic condition, for 
example that high inflation rates may put 
constraints on enhancing the competition in 
the banking industry. Under high inflation, 
prices of financial services, for example 
interest rates, will be less informative.  
 
Conclusion  
This study explored the role of market 
structure and foreign penetration in creating 
a competitive banking industry. The weak 
exogeneity test of market structure, which 
is measured by market concentration, and 
banking competition, shows that both va-
riables are endogenous to the system. It fa-
vours the New Industrial Organization ap-
proach that market structure is not exogen-
ous; rather it is determined by variables in 
the system, for example the freedom of en-
try and exit, market restrictions and foreign 
penetration.  
The cointegration tests of the series 
of three variables, market concentration, the 
evolution of competition, and the trend of 
foreign penetration, show that they are joint-
ly integrated using first differences. It im-
plies that the three variables have a long-run 
relationship. As the variables are integrated 
in the long-run and the model has an endo-
geneity issue, the VECM is appropriate to 
estimate the long-run relationship between 
market concentration, the evolution of com-
petition and the trend of foreign penetration 
The empirical results of seven mod-
els suggest that market concentration as a 
measure of market structure has a negative 
relationship with competition. The banking 
industry is more competitive if the market is 
less concentrated. A market with a lower 
concentration level may have a large num-
ber of banks or a more equal market share 
for banks. The larger number of banks in-
creases the cost of collusion. Thus, a smaller 
number of banks are more favourable to un-
competitive behaviour. In regards to the dis-
tribution of market share, a smaller number 
of large banks contribute to create a highly 
concentrated market even though overall the 
number of banks is large. In contrast, a 
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handful of banks with a relatively equal dis-
tribution of market share contribute to create 
a less concentrated market. This finding im-
plies that the structural approach also pro-
vides a valid prediction of the relationship 
between market structure and bank beha-
viour by recognizing the endogeneity issue 
between those two variables.  
Banking deregulation and liberali-
zation in the late 1980s and 1990s were ef-
fective in lowering market concentration 
because they widened access for private 
local and foreign banks to penetrate the lo-
cal banking market. The freedom of entry 
facilitated the establishment of new banks 
and increased the number of market play-
ers. A larger number of banks increased the 
cost of collusion and pushed banks to be 
more competitive. Banking consolidation in 
the 2000s also lowered the market concen-
tration compared to the crisis period be-
tween 1997 and 2000. Mergers of small 
private banks in the 2000s reduced the 
skewness of the market share distribution. 
A more equal-distribution of market share 
facilitates a more balanced capacity of 
banks to compete. Nevertheless, the merger 
of state banks following the 1997 crisis and 
the introduction of barriers to enter the 
market in the 2000s negatively influenced 
competition. The implementation of the 
Indonesian Banking Architecture in the 
2000s posed barriers to enter the market. In 
addition, the Survey of Banking Regulation 
and Supervision by the World Bank re-
vealed that in the 2000s there were no ap-
plications by local investors to establish a 
bank. However, there were at least fourteen 
applications received from foreign banks to 
acquire the local existing banks. All four-
teen applications for foreign acquired banks 
were accepted by the Central Bank. 
Foreign penetration also contributed 
to improve competition in the banking in-
dustry; however, the influence was not sta-
tistically significant. The Indonesian econ-
omy enjoyed benefits from the presence of 
foreign banks. As a developing country, 
Indonesia receives a spill-over impact from 
the presence of foreign banks. In regard to 
the modes of entry, the empirical results 
show that the establishment of joint ven-
tures and branches of foreign banks were 
crucial to enhance competition in the local 
market. The establishment of de novo oper-
ations increased the number of banks in the 
market and thus contributed to the creation 
of a less concentrated market. Further, de 
novo banks had a role in creating a contest-
able market as de novo banks were willing 
to behave more aggressively by cutting 
their interest margins. De novo banks put 
pressure on the local market to lower over-
all costs, lower intermediation costs, lower 
overhead costs, improve loan quality and 
reduce accounting profit. In contrast, for-
eign penetration through the acquisition of 
local private banks did not increase the 
number of banks. Further, foreign acquired 
banks were likely to behave less aggres-
sively compared to de novo banks, particu-
larly as acquisitions took place among large 
banks which had a captive market and loyal 
consumers.  
This study also finds that the reduc-
tion of the domination of government 
banks was crucial to foster competition. 
Government banks were perceived to be-
have in a less competitive way compared to 
their private counterparts. Their un-
competitive behaviour was related to the 
market power originating from captive 
funding from other state-owned companies 
and a long hierarchical organization. Final-
ly, the unfavourable macroeconomic condi-
tions, for example high inflation rates, may 
have put constraints on enhancing competi-
tion in the banking industry. Under high 
inflation, prices of financial services, for 
example interest rates, are less informative. 
The estimation result suggests that the ma-
croeconomic environment, represented by 
the rate of inflation, contributed to create a 
competitive banking industry.  
The above findings highlight some 
policy recommendations. Current consoli-
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dation following the 1997 economic crisis 
increased the degree of market concentra-
tion due to bank closures, bank mergers 
and barriers to enter the industry. At the 
introduction of barriers to enter the market, 
in the 2000s, foreign penetration was in the 
form of acquisition of local existing banks 
rather than the establishment of de novo 
banks. The empirical findings suggest that 
de novo banks put more pressure on com-
petition in the local banking market. The 
series of bank closures, mergers of state 
banks and barriers to enter the market show 
that the current policy of banking consoli-
dation did not promote competition. Fur-
thermore, the policy has weakened compe-
tition because, in fact, Indonesian banking 
is “under banked” (Rosengard and Prase-
tyantoko, 2011). The current banking sys-
tem has not been able to effectively meet 
demand, particularly from the medium and 
small sized borrowers. Restrictions on the 
establishment of new banks, by both local 
and foreign banks, inhibited the role of new 
entrants in creating a contestable market. 
The changing trend of foreign penetration 
from the establishment of de novo banks to 
the acquisition of local existing banks also 
posed concern about the reduction of the 
supply of loans to small scale borrowers. 
The data shows that de novo banks are 
mostly small banks, and foreign acquired 
banks are mostly large banks. The literature 
suggests that small banks lend proportion-
ally more to small enterprises (Rosengard 
and Prasetyantoko, 2011). There was a re-
duction in the supply of loans to small and 
medium enterprises during the consolida-
tion period. The portfolio of assets of 
banks, particularly the large banks, was 
mostly corporate loans, the investment of 
Bank Indonesia certificates (SBIs) and 
government bonds.    
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Appendix 
1. Panzar-Rosse (P-R) method 
Panzar-Rosse (P-R) method assesses the com-
petitive behaviour of banks based on the prop-
erties of reduced-form revenue equations at the 
bank level, and the data on revenues and factor 
prices. The P-R method calculates the sum of 
elasticity of the reduced form revenues with re-
spect to changes in factor prices. This sum of 
elasticity is given by H-statistics. The value of 
elasticity provides information about banks 
competitive behaviour. The assumption under-
lying this method is that the market power of 
banks is measured by the extent to which 
changes in factor prices (unit costs) are reflect-
ed in revenue earned (Vesala, 1995). If the in-
dustry is competitive, the elasticity will be high 
otherwise the elasticity will be low or even 
negative in the case of monopoly and collusive 
oligopoly. The properties of H-statistics allow 
us to distinguish empirically between common 
imperfect competition theories of price forma-
tion as characterizations of the competitive be-
haviour of Indonesia’s banks whether monopo-
ly or perfect collusion in the oligopoly market, 
monopolistic competition or perfect competi-
tion(Vesala, 1995). 
The following are empirical models to 
estimate the competitive environment in the In-
donesian banking industry between 1980 and 
2010. This empirical model is developed based 
on some studies in banking competition (Bikker 
and Haaf, 2002). 
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The Fixed-Effect (FE) approach of 
panel data was employed to estimate the com-
petitive behaviour of banks. This approach al-
lows the difference in the factor markets as it 
observes each bank across different points of 
time, produces a more reliable estimate of the 
H-statistics as it examines the behaviour of 
banks over time, produces more efficient esti-
mators as it has a greater number of observa-
tions from pooling the time series data of all 
banks, and captures the non time-varying de-
terminants of banks revenues. In estimating the 
yearly-value of the H-statistics, this study di-
vided the panel based on the break in the num-
ber of banks by breaking the panel based on the 
year where there is a significant change in the 
number of banks. Splitting the panel based on 
the break in the number of banks has a number 
of advantages. Firstly, this split method creates 
a more balanced panel. Secondly, the break of 
the number of banks is aligned with the struc-
tural changes in the banking industry because 
policy changes alter the competitive environ-
ment. The evolution of elasticity of the reduced 
form of revenues with respect to factor prices 
was calculated by summing up the coefficient 
of the interaction variables. The interaction va-
riables are the multiplication of input prices va-
riables and years dummies. 
 
2. Specification of Variables of Competitive Environment Test 
Variable Variable Specification 
i is the index for bank 
t is the index for year between 1980 and 2010 
n 
is the index for three input price variables which are R	, R, R 
TR
it
  is banks’ revenue measured by the values of total revenue or interest income of banks i and time t R	ST   is funding rate measured by the ratio of annual interest expenses to total deposits of bank i and 
time t RST    is wage rate/personnel expenses measured by the ratio of annual wage and salary expenses to 
total deposits plus total loans of bank i and time t RST    is capital rate measured by the ratio of other expenses to fixed assets of bank i and time t 
OI
it
  is the proportion of non-interest income measured by the ratio of non-interest income to interest 
income of bank i and time t 
EQ
it
  is capital risk measured by the ratio of equity to total assets of bank i and time t 
DEP
it
  is deposit mix measured by the ratio of total deposits on total assets of bank i and time t 
DDC
it
  is deposits mix measured by the ratio of demand deposits to total deposit of bank i and time t U  is the bank fixed effect (unobserved heterogeneity) V  is a white-noise error term that includes errors in the competition measure 
 
